Today, many commentators and media outlets specializing in the Middle East and the Islamic world have written about a significant anniversary. Exactly 40 years ago, on a cold and foggy morning on Thursday, February 1, 1979, the chartered Air France flight from Paris landed at Mehrabad International Airport near the center of Tehran. On board was an important figure in the history of Iran in the 20th century — Ruhollah Khomeini. As one of the main critics of the then Iranian monarch Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, he returned to his homeland after 14 years of exile to lead the anti-Shah uprisings that had broken out. This paved the way for the so-called «Islamic Revolution», which led to the establishment of the state that would embody its project — the «Islamic Republic of Iran».
Our long-time readers are well aware of our attitude towards the so-called «Islamic Republic of Iran», and therefore they can guess our attitude towards the so-called «Islamic Revolution» and its ideologue and leader. For those who do not know — we consider it to be a Shiite expansionist movement, a project and a leader who originally sought to conquer the Islamic, i.e. Sunni, world (despite all internal differences) under the slogans of «Shiite-Sunni Brotherhood», «Convergence of Mazhabs», «Common Struggle against Zionism and Imperialism», and so on. The price of these slogans became clear after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which the Khomeinists used to establish Shiite dominance in the country, and especially after the uprising in Syria, where the Khomeinists, contrary to their declared principles, sided with the ideologically hostile Baathist regime against the Sunni insurgents under the Islamic banner for purely sectarian reasons.
However much we may be convinced that it was not the followers of Khomeini who did this, but the betrayers of his ideas (analogous to the discussions about the good Lenin and the bad Stalin), those who were familiar with the views of the leader of this revolution and the Shiite works on which they were based had no doubt from the beginning that the state based on them would pursue exactly this policy. However, we will not take advantage of this date to reiterate our stance on these phenomena. Instead, it would be much more useful to try to evaluate them impartially as an experience and a historical phenomenon.
Despite the fact that at the time of the Shiite «Islamic Revolution» there had already been Sunni movements striving for something similar for decades, it happened only in Iran and was successful only for the Shiites. It is this circumstance that gave rise to the phenomenon of the 1979 generation, the admiration for this revolution by millions of Sunnis and even non-Muslims around the world who saw in it the triumph of ideas and principles that were unthinkable at the time — revolutionary monotheism, socially and politically active religiosity, the struggle against the idols of Western materialist capitalism and Soviet atheist communism, an open challenge to global Zionism and usury.
Why has all this been achieved on the Shiite religious platform and served to spread it, while it has not succeeded on our Sunni platform? There have been few, if any, attempts by Sunnis to analyze this objectively. Instead, many of our co-religionists try to explain the phenomenon of this revolution solely in terms of external conspiracies, be it the behind-the-scenes support of Israel, the Anglo-Saxons, the Freemasons, or the more fashionable conspiratorial reasons of our time. But however much we may like it, it was the man who came to Iran from political exile 40 years ago who managed to combine determination with caution, uncompromising strategy with flexibility in tactics, and also to translate religious ideas into a modern, politically understandable language that millions could grasp.
A few years ago, we witnessed the emergence of a military-political formation that proclaimed itself the state of all Sunni Muslims worldwide and the embodiment of their aspirations and values. It controlled a territory the size of several states, a considerable amount of oil, and significant weapons reserves. In principle, the situation in which it emerged was in many ways similar to the situation in which the IRI emerged. The latter also faced considerable hostility and resistance and was forced to fight for its survival.
But why did it succeed, while the «Sunni state» ceased to exist within a few years? Is it not because the ideology of the creators of the «IRI» not only made its struggle for survival and its own values inevitable, but also allowed it to use the necessary political and legal instruments, to seek allies among non-Muslims, to convey to them the advantages of peaceful coexistence instead of total war?
However, to take the Khomeinist project as an example to follow in 2019 is to emulate the generals who prepared for past wars. Despite all the strengths of this project, its systemic crisis has become evident today. Yes, in military and political terms, the «IRI» as a project of political Shiism has demonstrated its complete superiority over the Sunni world through the events in Syria, where it faced a handful of Sunni partisans fighting against the regular army and paramilitary formations recruited to support them from the entire Shiite world.
However, the massive unrest of young people and citizens in Iran itself against this backdrop showed that the regime established in 1979 is on its last legs and is maintained by the terror of the authorities — the same kind that Khomeini was unable to stop back then… In economic terms, Khomeinist Iran has achieved considerable successes, especially under sanctions and blockade, the most important of which is its own survival. Today, however, in the realities of the global information society, it is clear that isolated economies in the style of North Korea have no prospects, regardless of their ideological packaging, and that the opposition of religion to the possibilities of accessible (through images) civilization is increasingly repulsing the youth.
Against this backdrop, the situation in the Sunni world is more optimistic, because in addition to the unsuccessful projects mentioned above, there have been many more successful attempts to embody the eternal values of religion in an attractive modern form. Irrespective of their relations with each other or our attitude towards them or certain aspects of their policies, Turkey, Qatar, Malaysia or even the UAE are countries that are much more attractive to their youth or foreign professionals and investors, while at the same time positioning themselves as Muslim.
Of course, everything has its price, and we all understand very well the price these countries have to pay for these development opportunities. Today, however, the rhetoric of the leaders of Turkey or Malaysia is little different from the official rhetoric of Iran, and their policies are becoming more and more independent. And most importantly, what has changed since 1979 is the world order and the main forces of global politics. Other ideologies (equally hostile to Islam) have replaced communism in countries that were its strongholds, the Western bloc is in disarray, Zionism is causing more and more irritation among the liberal, globalist part of Judaism, and China is filling the niche of the USSR as well as the West, including in Muslim countries, to a greater extent.
It is precisely in these new conditions that Iran, whose official ideology is increasingly incompatible with reality, is forced to seek its place. Nevertheless, the events of 40 years ago in that country remain relevant both as a political experience and as a central myth of the state and project with which Sunni Muslims and the entire world must grapple. And as such, they demand thoughtful reflection.