Against the backdrop of a conspicuous domestic failure related to the transition of Istanbul to opposition control, last week was marked by less conspicuous but no less significant foreign policy achievements for Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
First, at the G20 summit, US President Donald Trump unexpectedly recognized the validity of his Turkish counterpart’s position on the purchase of the S-400 and declared that he would obstruct the US Congress’ plans to impose promised sanctions against Turkey. Experts are still speculating about the reasons behind this change of position — whether it is Trump’s general course of reducing confrontation with all problematic regional powers for the US, given his conciliatory statements on China, Russia and North Korea. Or concessions on more sensitive issues for Washington, be it Venezuela (which is less likely, given Ankara’s limited capabilities to counter American plans in that country) or Iran, on which the US may have to concentrate its efforts. Another possibility that cannot be completely ruled out is the dishonest game of the American president, who is known for his contradictory statements and actions. The nature of the American political system, which limits the president’s powers, facilitates these actions and allows him to always explain unfulfilled promises as opposition or «deep state» intrigues.
The second significant success for Erdogan was the recognition by the Libyan Napoleon, Khalifa Haftar, who suffered a significant defeat last week at the hands of the forces of the internationally recognized government, that Turkey thwarted his plans to seize power in the country. Recall that Ankara officially acknowledges its support for the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is trying to overthrow the military adventurer Khalifa Haftar, relying on the support of the broad coalition of the UAE, French military intelligence circles, the U.S. and Eugene Prigozhin’s hybrid war machine controlled by the Kremlin. For now, judging by Haftar’s reluctance, Erdogan is succeeding in Libya what he failed to do in Syria — keep a significant part of the strategically important country under the control of his allies. In our view, there are three main factors contributing to this: 1) The unity and adequacy of the forces of the Libyan revolution, united under a single military-political leadership, which put an end to internal strife and the emergence of destructive forces within their ranks that ate away at the revolution from within, as happened in Syria. 2) International recognition of the GNA as the legitimate government of the country. This is an issue that is often not properly understood due to the dominance and confrontation of two polar views of international law. One is the naive hope for international law, the international community and its intervention, and the belief that whoever they support will win. Since life has repeatedly shattered these illusions, many people, especially in the Muslim world, have developed an opposite attitude that completely disregards international law and the international community. In reality, both views are wrong. Of course, international law and the support of the international community have little influence when they are weak and on the opposite side, as the situation with the occupation of Crimea has shown. Therefore, in those situations where, as Mao Zedong said, «power grows out of the barrel of a gun,» one should undoubtedly understand that without such a «gun,» international law and the international community are useless to anyone who relies on them. On the other hand, as numerous examples have shown, when the military forces of the parties are approximately equal, the factor of international recognition plays an important role. For example, during the war in Bosnia, the fact that Muslims fought under the aegis of the country’s internationally recognized government allowed them to obtain supplies of necessary weapons and to exert international pressure on the aggressor country, significantly weakening its economy and defense potential. In Syria, the fact that the international community, despite condemning the Assad regime to a significant extent, did not delegitimize its status as the legitimate authority of the country, facilitated the regime’s receipt of military support from its sponsors, who established control over that country under the guise of its «legitimate authority. In Libya, the revolutionaries were more fortunate — they were able to take advantage of a favorable international conjuncture, overthrow Muammar Gaddafi, quickly form a government, and gain its international recognition. And now Erdogan finds it much easier to support the country’s legitimate government in its fight against the rebel Haftar. 3) The last but not the least significant fact that dampens our enthusiasm about the recent events in Libya is that Turkey and its allies have not yet faced any serious resistance there. That is, unlike in Syria, where their rivals provided their protégé with full military support on the ground (Iran) and in the air (Russia). At the beginning of the war in Syria, when roughly equal forces of the rebels and the Assad regime faced each other, the support provided by Turkey and Qatar in the form of arms supplies, allowing the passage of volunteers, etc. was enough to gain control over most of the country’s territory. However, the situation changed dramatically when Iran and Russia fully entered Syria, while Turkey did not dare to do the same and was forced to negotiate a small enclave for the rebels in the northeast of the country in exchange for surrendering most of its territory to the regime. No one in Libya has seriously come out in support of Haftar yet, and let us hope that this will not happen precisely because of the aforementioned point — the international recognition of the GNA as the legitimate authority that Haftar opposes. Nevertheless, we must not forget that «business is judged by its completion» — a principle that applies not only to individual human lives, but also to conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya. It is not enough to start a war successfully and effectively; it is equally important to maintain and develop the initiative and achieve the desired end result. This is what Turkey is now facing in Libya, where the enraged Napoleon Haftar has captured 6 Turkish citizens and is trying to blackmail Ankara. In response, Ankara has already declared that if they are not released immediately, Haftar’s forces will become a legitimate target for Turkish strikes. We will continue to monitor the situation.