Recent news from Turkey’s domestic political life has caused outrage and concern both among supporters of the still ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and among observant Muslims as a whole. It should be noted that not long ago, the AKP lost several strategic cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, in local elections, while its main opponents from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which proclaims itself as the guardian of Mustafa Kemal’s ideological legacy, were successful. And so far, nothing dramatic has happened. But the first steps of the victors in the field of cultural politics, supported by the judiciary, raise alarming questions: in which direction will Turkey go when the AKP ceases to be the ruling party, whose prospects are already becoming apparent? And, most importantly, how is this possible?
But first, let’s clarify what is being discussed. Immediately after the CHP came to power in Ankara, the design of the city’s official website changed. The «before» and «after» can be seen in the photo above. On the one hand, there was a technocratic, futuristic image of a city striving for the future, and on the other, there was a vibrant Islamic image of its past, intertwined in this way. The city’s image is now dominated by the idolatrous mausoleum of Kemal and his portrait. In addition, it was announced that a Turkish court had overturned the ban on gay parades in Ankara imposed by representatives of the ruling party in 2017. A coincidence? The judiciary in Turkey is independent of the local government. However, it is worth noting that, as we have previously written, the «most progressive» representatives of the CHP openly support the so-called LGBT community by signing official cooperation agreements with them. In the same article, we wrote the following: «Such a demonstrative gesture on the part of the CHP, even if it is the local branch of the district known as the «hub» (since the central leadership of the party has silently approved it), should be taken into account in any discussion about the internal political and inter-party processes in the country. Recently, much has been made of the fact that a hypothetical return of the CHP to power in a coalition with the IYI party does not pose a threat of state Islamophobic revenge because Turkish society has changed and the rights that practicing Muslims have secured thanks to the AKP are no longer contested by anyone. The same CHP members, it should be noted, greeted the news of their victory in the Ankara elections with takbirs and zikrs in their campaign headquarters, and the CHP candidate who either won or did not win the Istanbul mayoral election, Ekrem Imamoglu, stopped his supporters from chanting slogans about Atatürk’s soldiers and declared that he wants to be the mayor of all citizens. So the CHP is not the same as before, but it is also not the same in many respects, as can be seen. Under the old CHP, it would be hard to imagine that takbirs and zikrs would be performed to celebrate the election victory, but also its representatives would not allow public fraternization with LGBT activists. Thus, this liberalization of the neo-Kemalists is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it seems to guarantee no return to discrimination and repression against practicing Muslims; on the other hand, it opens the door to the disintegration of Muslim society by the forces that, incidentally, are not at all tolerant of those who disagree with them.
Therefore, the prospects for pious Muslims in relation to the AKP’s loss of power do not seem optimistic. But what can we conclude from this? For the unwavering supporters of this party, the answer is obvious: no matter what, they must fight to keep their power and prevent the opposition from coming to power. Well, if the opposition looks exactly like the CHP, it cannot be said that such an approach is groundless. However, in a multi-party democratic system, which Turkey still has, not everything depends on the wishes of the supporters of one party. It must be understood that party life and competition in such a system is a natural environment in which conflicts, divisions, intrigues, contradictions, as well as changes in the mood of the electorate, their disillusionment with old politicians and enthusiasm for new ones, and fatigue and excitement are inevitable. A characteristic example of this is Ukraine, where a comedian with no political background was elected president, despite the historical tensions between him and the Ukrainian people.
Demographic, generational and historical preferences sometimes play a decisive role in such a system. Sociological studies have long shown that the religiosity of the younger generations of Turks is not increasing, as one might have hoped, after almost 20 years of rule by the pro-Islamic AKP, but is rather decreasing. This confirms the insight of the medieval Muslim sociologist Ibn Khaldun, who wrote about the decisive influence of lifestyle on customs, in this case an urban capitalist lifestyle with its consumerist attitude towards the world. Similar processes are taking place in many countries of the Islamic world, but why, for example, does the «LGBT community» in countries like Malaysia or Kuwait, which also have a high standard of living and a developing economy, not expect the legalization of gay parades or the signing of cooperation agreements with mayors, while this is happening in Turkey?
To understand the answer to this question, it is enough to compare their constitutions, i.e. the basic laws of the country. For example, Article 3 of the Malaysian Constitution states: «1. Islam shall be the religion of the Federation, but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation. 2. In any State other than States where the Ruler is the Head of the religion of Islam in his State, in the manner and to the extent recognized and declared by the Constitution of that State, and subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all the rights, privileges, prerogatives and powers which he enjoys as Head of that religion shall be unaffected and unimpaired. However, for any act, matter, ritual or ceremony which, in the opinion of the Council of Rulers, should involve the Federation as a whole, each of the other Rulers shall, by virtue of his position as the Head of the religion of Islam, delegate his powers to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 3. The State Constitutions of Melaka, Pulau Pinang, Sabah and Sarawak shall contain a provision to the effect that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall be the Head of the Religion of Islam in those States.»
Or Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Constitution: «The religion of the State shall be Islam, and the Islamic Shari’ah shall be the main source of legislation.»
So what is the main law of Turkey under which Erdogan’s pro-Islamic (or, as it is sometimes called, Islamist) party must operate? Here are some of the most characteristic quotes (highlighted by us):
«In accordance with the concept of nationalism, as well as the forms and principles proclaimed by the immortal leader and incomparable hero, Atatürk, the present constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and homeland, as well as the indivisible unity of the Turkish state, embodies… … the understanding of the absolute supremacy of the will of the nation and the fact that sovereignty belongs fully and unconditionally to the Turkish nation and that no person or body authorized to exercise this sovereignty on behalf of the nation may exceed the limits of liberal democracy and the legal system established according to its requirements;… … the recognition that no views or beliefs may be contrary to the national interests of Turkey, the principle of the indissoluble unity of Turkish citizens with their country and territory, the historical and spiritual values of Turkey, or to nationalism, the principles, reforms and transformations of Atatürk, as required by the principle of secularism, religious feelings shall not influence state affairs and policies in any way. …. Article 2. The Republic of Turkey shall be a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law, based on the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to Atatürk’s nationalism and founded on the principles stated in the Preamble…Article 4. The provisions of Article 1 of the Constitution, which establishes the form of the State as a Republic, the provisions of Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provisions of Article 3 cannot be amended, nor can proposals be made for their amendment.»
In principle, these quotations are sufficient to answer the aforementioned questions. It is clear from them that whatever party comes to power in this country, it will be forced to act within the established framework, and any attempt to go beyond it will sooner or later be put in place by those who guard it. Understanding this, the then speaker of the Turkish Parliament from the AKP, Ismail Kahraman, proposed three years ago to adopt a new constitution that would establish the Islamic identity of the Turkish state. However, it should be noted that Kahraman’s proposal, which was met with a wave of outrage from secularist ideologues, was not supported by his own party at the time, and he eventually disappeared from the scene, making way for representatives of the new line, such as Binali Yildirim (who lost the Istanbul mayoral election), who invokes Kemal in his mausoleum. This is precisely why the possibility of a new ideological shift in Turkey, as more and more young people go to the polls, should not come as a surprise. A wise person once said that revolution is like riding a bicycle, in the sense that it cannot stand still, it either moves forward or falls. When the ruling party entered the political bicycle, which many friends and enemies perceived as Islamic, it eventually came to the conclusion that it had reached the maximum, and it stopped and began to balance on it. As a result, instead of being at the forefront of such a revolution, it settled for the niche of a conservative parliamentary party that promotes the interests of the religious constituency within the state system based on Mustafa Kemal. And as long as this constituency has the resources of a demographic majority, it is somewhat successful. How long this will last and what will happen after that is an open question.