When the Second Karabakh War ended, we wrote an article stating that although the Muslims were able to achieve an important victory in this war, it was too early for them to rest on their laurels, as serious challenges for both Azerbaijan and Turkey were just beginning.
«…from the very beginning, it was clear that both Azerbaijan and Armenia were not the only players in this war, but allies of major regional and even global powers, whose interests converged in this war…» — We wrote in this article, as well as warned several months before the war that Armenia’s involvement as a proxy in the Great Game on the side of Turkey’s enemies would bring it serious problems.
But the Caucasian front is not the only direction of this Great Game, which has the potential to turn into a Great War, and perhaps not even the main one. The main and growing risks for Turkey lie in the Mediterranean direction, as we wrote in the summer of 2019. At that time, we pointed out the following:
«Objectively, Turkey has a chance to succeed in the Mediterranean direction, and one of its main arguments is its powerful naval forces. On the other hand, it should be understood that the Mediterranean, which has been the center of the world’s leading civilizations for thousands of years, is as desirable as it is fraught with enormous risks. Ankara can calculate that Greece is a weak opponent for it, and the EU and NATO are currently unable to help it. Once, during the Cyprus war, such calculations were justified and it is not excluded that it can be repeated now. However, it is also necessary to consider the changes in the geopolitical landscape — during the Cyprus War, Turkey was needed by the West as an ally to contain the USSR, while now, especially in connection with Turkey’s purchase of S-400 from Russia, Turkey’s status as a NATO member is already being openly questioned… Thus, there is a risk of the emergence of a broad anti-Turkish coalition in the Mediterranean, which could include Greece, Israel, NATO with Russia, and Egypt as an ally of the Saudis, while it is still unclear on whose support Ankara can rely in the confrontation with them».
Let’s see what is happening now… Today, multinational exercises have started in the Mediterranean Sea with the participation of the naval and air forces of Greece and Cyprus, France, Egypt and the UAE. This is happening against the backdrop of an apparent conflict between Turkey and Greece over disputed gas fields and the status of Northern Cyprus, as well as a systemic conflict between Turkey and France and the UAE.
In previous, more peaceful years, such exercises could have been seen as nothing more than psychological pressure, but the Second Karabakh War clearly confirmed the dramatic rule — «if a gun is hanging on the wall in the first act, it must be fired in the second». And the guns are clearly being prepared to fire — not only within the framework of these exercises, but also through plans for a comprehensive military reform and rearmament of the Greek army, which is clearly being inflated as a new military outpost against Turkey. On October 27, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced that 20 next-generation American F-35 fighter jets produced for Turkey would be delivered to… Greece.
This is an obvious and expected price for Turkey’s purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, but it does not end there. The Greek military and political leadership has announced plans for a comprehensive reform of the structure and modernization of the weapons of the Greek army from 2020 to 2034, with the aim of transforming it into a powerful military outpost in the northeastern Mediterranean.
Today, of course, it is not the beginning of the 20th century, and hardly anyone except naive Dashnaks believes that Turkey’s opponents are preparing to dismantle it. But this is no longer necessary. Turkey’s opponents are betting on the return to power of the Kemalists, for whom the defeat of the current «Islamist government» in a sensitive direction, such as Cyprus, would be a real gift. One could imagine it like this: «A century ago, Atatürk created Turkey from the ruins of the Islamic empire, and a hundred years later, the Islamists came to power and destroyed his achievements» — just like the defeat of Greece with the support of its ally, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was also created during the Kemalist era. After all, both Turkey’s economic and political systems continue to exist within the logic of Western capitalism and multiparty democracy, so it is crucial for Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his allies to meet the challenge of the economic crisis and to be seen as winners on the international stage, rather than «losers» in the event of a military defeat by the Greek-French-Emirati-Egyptian coalition, in order to remain in power.
Does Erdogan understand all this? Of course, he cannot fail to understand, and as an experienced geopolitician, he is surely preparing counter moves in this game. Let’s consider what they might be.
Objectively speaking, considering the combination of economic and military factors, time is currently working against Erdogan, so he can have two winning strategies in the Mediterranean — either to start a war now, while Greece has not had time to create an army capable of crushing the Turkish one with the support of its allies, or to reach an agreement with Greece before such a war becomes inevitable. Moreover, according to the principle «if you want peace, prepare for war», in order to achieve the second option, Erdogan will still have to prepare for the first one. What steps will he have to take?
At the moment, Greece will not be able to defeat Turkey on its own, so its main allies — the UAE, Egypt and France — will have to be taken out of the game. It will be most difficult with France, so we should probably assume that its participation in a hypothetical war is inevitable. However, France has vulnerabilities — its Muslim part of the colonial zone, as well as internal ones that can flare up against the backdrop of such a conflict, and the significant dissatisfaction of the French themselves with their establishment, which we are seeing these days and which we have previously observed in the form of the «yellow vest» protests.
As for Egypt, everything is more or less clear here — the Sisi regime must either be overthrown or maintained at a high level of threat of overthrow, for which the support and activation of the Muslim Brotherhood opposition, which still retains its potential, is necessary. In this Turkey can be helped by the United Kingdom, which is waging a war against France and sees Ankara as its ally in this war.
British support can also be useful to remove the UAE from the anti-Turkish game, or rather the group whose front man is Prince Mohammed bin Zayed. Here, the new rhetoric of Erdogan’s propaganda resources is quite interesting — they used to link Muhammad bin Zayed with the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, but recently they have begun to contrast them, as Ibrahim Karagul does in his recent article, the editor-in-chief of «Yeni Safak», who presents the Saudi prince as a victim of Emirati intrigues and states the involvement of the UAE leadership in a conspiracy aimed at dismembering Saudi Arabia.
Strategically, Turkey has two options with Mohammed bin Zayed — either to remove him from power and replace him with its ally, or to attack the UAE as a whole. The latter can be done successfully by Iran in the event of an escalation of the conflict, which the Donald Trump administration is trying to achieve, especially through the assassination of the head of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. In this case, Turkey’s important task is to prevent Saudi Arabia from getting involved in the conflict on the side of the UAE in order to contribute to its isolation and defeat at the hands of Iran, which could be facilitated by the ongoing normalization of Turkish-Saudi relations.
In this context, Turkey could provoke Greece into a war and inflict a serious defeat on it in the near future, thwarting its plans to become a regional military power. Alternatively, Turkey could use the threat of such a war to present an ultimatum to both Athens and Berlin, which has a decisive influence on it, in order to force Greece into an acceptable deal with Turkey, including a fair division of maritime waters and the settlement of the status of Cyprus.
It is this last issue, the status of Cyprus, that will now become an indicator of the development of these processes. Erdogan has declared his intention to seek recognition of the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by foreign states, which is an obvious element of a confrontational scenario.
It is, by the way, absolutely symmetrical with the recognition by France of the independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the decision of which was adopted by the French Senate and supported by Macron’s party, but not by Macron himself as the president of the country, who distances himself from it. Against this background, the possibility of recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by Turkey’s closest allies — first Qatar and Azerbaijan, and possibly others later — is now being discussed. But this is, on the one hand, a path to war with Greece and, on the other hand, a high risk for Azerbaijan, which consistently stands for the defense of internationally recognized borders and against separatism. On the other hand, it could be a collection of trump cards for subsequent negotiations, in which numerous issues will be resolved, including those related to the terms of reintegration or exchange of the Turkish part of Cyprus and the diminished Armenian enclave of Karabakh. For Turkey, this question is globally linked to the questions of a new format of relations with the United States and the European Union, from which there is no escape.
Erdogan must accomplish all this before a new president takes office in the White House, or at least establishes himself there. Perhaps this is why the Greek-French-Arab exercises in the Mediterranean have begun, in order to prevent him from doing so.
But let’s not forget that the Second Karabakh War started almost immediately after similar multinational exercises on the territory of Armenia. By the way, the above-mentioned article by Ibrahim Karagul directly states that the war in Karabakh was started in response to the intrigues of Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, who is now plotting them in the Eastern Mediterranean…
In conclusion, Turkey could provoke Greece into a war and inflict a serious defeat on it in the near future, thwarting its plans to become a regional military power. Alternatively, Turkey could use the threat of such a war to present an ultimatum to Greece and Berlin, which has a decisive influence on Greece, to force Greece into an acceptable deal with Turkey, including a fair division of maritime waters and the settlement of the status of Cyprus. The question of the status of Cyprus will become an indicator of the development of these processes. Erdogan has declared his intention to seek foreign recognition of the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is an obvious element of a confrontational scenario. Against this background, discussions have begun on the possible recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by Turkey’s closest allies — first Qatar and Azerbaijan, and possibly others later. This path, however, carries the risk of war with Greece and a high risk for Azerbaijan, which has consistently stood for the defense of internationally recognized borders and against separatism.
For Turkey, it is crucial to achieve its goals before a new president takes office in the White House or consolidates his position there. The Greek-French-Arab exercises in the Mediterranean may be an attempt to prevent Turkey from achieving its goals.
It is important to note, however, that political decisions and actions may ultimately deviate from the scenarios outlined here, as they are subject to various factors and dynamics in the region.