Recently, several events have occurred that allow us to assess the strategy of the Russian authorities with regard to migration of predominantly Muslim and mainly Central Asian origin. First, a well-known human rights defender and activist of the Tajik diaspora in Moscow, Izzat Amon, was deported from Russia to Tajikistan. Then it was announced that a Russian imam, Ashoni Saidnuriddin, who had lived in Russia for twenty years, had been stripped of his Russian citizenship and deported to Tajikistan. This week, Vladimir Putin declared that the number of migrant children in Russian schools should be such that «they can integrate into our Russian values.
All this has led some to conclude that the Kremlin has decided to get rid of migrants. Is this true? In order to properly assess the Kremlin’s plans regarding Muslim migrants in Russia, it is necessary to abandon the simplistic scheme in which such relations can only be «for» or «against» migration.
In reality, Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia needs migrants, especially for certain sectors of its economy. This is an objective fact. In his twenty years in power, Putin has not been able to solve the demographic problem of Russians. Moreover, the demographic situation of the Russian people, whose core regions (the Central Federal District) are experiencing the most significant decline, is one of the worst.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Russian authorities, having failed to solve the demographic problem of native Russians and apparently never intending to seriously address it, objectively need migration, especially cheap and unskilled labor.
What the Russian regime has always seen and continues to see as a threat is the strengthening of Islam as a whole and its transformation into a force capable of uniting Muslim peoples and communities in Russia and becoming a powerful socio-political factor that to some extent determines its development. Central Asian migration was and is perceived as a challenge and potential threat in this sense — as a breeding ground in which Muslims can organize to escape the control of their tyrannical Islamophobic regimes, and as a potential demographic and human resource support for the Ummah in Russia.
It is therefore not surprising that the Kremlin targets those who pose such a threat. Just as a flock scatters without its leaders and a herd without its shepherd, migrants who are torn from their roots, thrown into a foreign environment, and forced to survive under social and economic pressures become vulnerable without capable people to unite and guide them. In this sense, the Kremlin needs to neutralize the potential threat of migration and turn it into its own resource. In the short term, it is a labor and economic resource (just one type of patent brings billions into the Russian budget, not to mention the «gray» and «black» niches they cover), and in the long term, «new Russians» capable of compensating for the decline of «old Russians.»
But to ensure that they are indeed «Russians,» they need to be properly educated, which is what Putin means when he demands that migrant children be imbued with «Russian values.
What values does Putin mean? Personally, Putin probably means what can be understood as «empty values». Unfortunately, these values are quite strong among many representatives of older generations of migrants and ethnic Muslims in the post-Soviet space. However, this phenomenon is fading, because today there is no real ideology and project behind them, as there was in the USSR, regardless of one’s attitude to it. The current «wattage» is like an empty wrapper from which the sweets have long been removed (we are not discussing the composition, content and usefulness of these sweets now) and replaced by some garbage.
Young people and open-minded people understand this very well, especially since the Central Asian peoples have a rich cultural heritage deeply rooted in Islam. That is why it is important for the Kremlin and its Islamophobic satellite post-communists in countries like Tajikistan not to allow people to turn to Islam and unite on this platform. However, in such conditions of the inevitable crisis of «wattage» on the one hand, and the struggle against Islamic revival on the other hand, an increasing number of migrant youth, who will be diligently assimilated to «Russian values», can become prey to so-called «liberalism» — «left liberalism», «cultural liberalism», «progressivism», and so on.
It is in this context that we should understand the phenomenon of Manizha Sangin, sent by Russia to the Eurovision Song Contest. It shows the absurdity of the Kremlin’s and its propagandists’ discussions about traditional values, combating the propaganda of homosexuality, etc., while from the very beginning they have been fighting the only force capable of supporting healthy values — Islam, which has attracted many representatives of non-Muslim peoples. As a result of its Islamophobic policy, the Kremlin has opened the space for precisely what it was supposedly fighting against, and it will continue to do so by imposing «Russian values» on Muslim children. Both «wattists» and «liberals» will contribute to this, but in essence they will be doing the same work with different hands.
So how should Muslims behave in such a situation? First and foremost, like our opponents, we must understand that migration can be both a resource and a challenge. If the brothers and sisters who think and practice Islam are a resource and an addition to Islam in Russia, and that is why they are being targeted, then the new «Wattists» and «liberals» among the migrants are the reinforcement of our enemies.
Moreover, we must understand that while ten multiplied by ten equals one hundred, multiplied by zero it equals zero. Muslim history, including Russia, has witnessed many examples of the strengthening of the local Ummah through the addition of Muslim settlers. But if the local Ummah itself is close to zero, won’t the newcomers automatically become zero as well? Therefore, today we should not harbor unrealistic hopes that an influx of disenfranchised migrants can strengthen the Ummah in Russia. Instead, we should acknowledge its abysmal condition and think about how to improve it.
As for our brothers and sisters who are moving to Russia, if they want to benefit Islam, whether at home, in Russia, or both, they must first understand its realities, and if they do not understand them, we must explain them to them. In Russia today, the Islamic movement represented by its native citizens has been almost wiped out; many of them had to leave their country themselves (those who were not killed or imprisoned). This does not mean that nothing can be done in this field, but it does mean that it is foolish to continue as if nothing had happened. If possible, one should either crawl unnoticed or move from cover to cover. This is true twice for migrants and three times for those who do not even have Russian citizenship.
By the way, we would like to take this opportunity to appeal to the representatives of Islamic thinking of the Central Asian peoples who read us, to pass our request on to them. During the Izzat Amon incident, his compatriots in Moscow approached us and asked what they should do to help him. For example, if they should organize an impromptu rally at an embassy or an institution or something like that. We could not take responsibility for the fate of these people because, first, we understand the possible risks of such actions for them and, second, we cannot fully assess the situation. But why do these people have to turn to us? Why, for example, does the Party of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan not work with Tajik youth in Moscow? Of course, they cannot work in Russia, and we do not encourage them to do so. But why not assign the task of informing and coordinating the numerous Tajik diaspora in Russia to one of the party’s foreign centers?
It is such questions, namely how to help Muslims survive and develop and preserve their religion in a hostile environment, that we need to think about if we want them to be a resource for Islam rather than for its enemies.