The case of the mysterious transfer of one of the Tajik opposition leaders, Sharofiddin Gadoyev, from the safety of the Netherlands to Tajikistan, where he expressed his repentance and recognition of the Rahmon regime and called on his former comrades to do the same, is intriguing in many ways.
Rahmon’s special services are now accused of abducting Gadoyev, which could only have been done in cooperation with the Russian special services, since Gadoyev had come to Russia «for negotiations». However, Gadoyev was not abducted from the Netherlands, where he was granted political asylum and where he conducted his political activities from his own office. If he was indeed kidnapped (more on this «if» a little later), it would have been in Russia, and accusing Russian and Tajik special services of kidnapping an inconvenient person on the territory of present-day Russia is like accusing wolves of «kidnapping» a hare who came directly to their pack «for negotiations».
Before leaving for Russia, Gadoyev recorded a video warning of what might happen to him. But why did he fly to Russia for negotiations anyway? Even if we believe in the necessity of negotiations between the Tajik opposition and representatives of the Russian leadership at this moment, and note that these are unofficial negotiations, why couldn’t they have been held in a neutral country like Malaysia, if not in the Netherlands (a NATO country)? After all, if the other party really needs such negotiations, it would not be a problem for them to attend them in another country, and if they are not needed, why do you need such negotiations?
How many more Tajiks have to be kidnapped and killed by the special services on the territory of Putin’s Russia for the leadership of the Tajik opposition to finally understand that this is not a safe place for them and not the place for such «negotiations»? Unlike the official negotiations with the Taliban, which are forbidden in Russia, they come at Russia’s official invitation, which obliges it to guarantee their safety. However, the Tajik opposition has not been officially invited to any negotiations in Russia, and therefore nothing should be guaranteed to them.
Another important question is the role of the Russian lawyer Nikolai Nikolaev in the situation, whom the Tajik opposition leaders are now essentially accusing in the media of having organized Gadoev’s negotiations with certain people from the Russian leadership and, consequently, his abduction. In this regard, it should be noted that Nikolaev was previously the lawyer of another Tajik opposition leader, Umarali Kuvvatov, who was killed by the special services in Istanbul in 2015… We will discuss the role of lawyer Nikolayev a little later, but first we will discuss whether Gadoyev’s appearance in Tajikistan, where he made the aforementioned statement, was an abduction.
Frankly, Gadoev in this video does not look like a person speaking under duress. Of course, it is obvious that he is agitated, which is natural in such a situation, but it is also clear that he is not reading from a memorized and imposed text, but is speaking eloquently and at length. And unfortunately, these are not very good symptoms for such a situation. Especially in view of the information that he expressed last summer, he allowed himself to return to his homeland under the guarantee of the regime.
In response to our question about what happened to Gadoyev, lawyer Nikolayev said the following: «Sharofiddin Gadoev was provided with contacts with political circles interested in developing relations with democratic forces in Tajikistan. He was given an opportunity to present his vision of the development of Russian-Tajik relations and the solution of internal problems in Tajikistan itself. After the last communication, I learned that he had planned meetings with Tajik representatives in Russia. Then he disappeared. Whether this was the subject of agreements with the Tajik side on voluntary return, or whether he was abducted without his consent, I can only speculate. There are still no precise data. Many assumptions can be made about this issue, including conspiracy theories. In my opinion, there are two possible scenarios — guarantees from Tajikistan and the return of business or a game of the special services».
It is obvious that lawyer Nikolayev does not deny that he acted as an intermediary between Gadoyev and people in the Russian leadership who, in the best case scenario, were unable to ensure his safety on their territory. If we don’t consider the possibility that he left voluntarily on the basis of agreements with the Tajik authorities, about which some media are now writing about his possible meetings with their representatives. But the question for Nikolai Nikolaev is: in what capacity and why did he organize such negotiations, the result of which was either Gadoyev’s abduction or his siding with the regime? If he acted as his personal lawyer and intermediary, independent of any political obligations to the Tajik opposition, it is understandable. However, as far as we know, in addition to being the lawyer of the murdered Tajik opposition leader, he regularly participates in foreign events as part of the Russian opposition (such as the Free Russia Forum in Vilnius), as well as the Tajik opposition, such as the Dortmund Conference, where, according to media reports, he had contact with Gadoev last summer. Why and in what capacity does attorney Nikolaev participate? To find clients and solve their personal problems? Or to help the whole opposition? Or something else?
But let’s finish what we started — no matter how Gadoev ended up in Tajikistan and what role lawyer Nikolaev played, it does not absolve the political responsibility of the Tajik opposition leadership for what happened. After such an experience of years of futile hopes to win the favor of the Kremlin against the background of multiple abductions and killings of Tajik dissidents in Russia, it is time for them to understand that this is not the country that can serve as a safe mediator in negotiations with the Rahmon regime and where such negotiations are possible. Let’s hope that at least now the leaders of the Tajik opposition will draw the necessary conclusions from this situation and not allow themselves to be bitten from one hole to another, probably for the hundredth time.