This year, two information events practically coincided — the anniversary of the beginning of the 44-day Second Karabakh War and the resumption of the confrontation over Kosovo.
It is not worth writing in detail about what the Second Karabakh War meant for Azerbaijan and the entire region, fortunately, much has already been written and said about it. In Azerbaijan, it is officially called the Patriotic War, and the country is currently holding celebrations and commemorations dedicated to these events, as well as to the soldiers who fell a year ago.
In the region, this war dramatically changed the balance of power between the South Caucasus states — Azerbaijan and Armenia — as well as the designation of a new player — Turkey. Now, a year later, voices are increasingly heard about the possibility of a «Karabakh scenario» repeating itself in a completely different region.
We are talking about the Balkans and in particular Kosovo, about which we have already written today. The fundamental difference is that if the Second Karabakh War was a success for the Muslims, those who want to repeat its scenario in Kosovo, on the contrary, dream of taking revenge on the Muslims.
Of course, one can reflect on what caused the recent escalation there. But it is much more important to understand why it started and how it can end. Serbia is now moving its military forces towards the borders of Kosovo, and a military campaign under the slogan «Kosovo is Serbia» is starting in the country, which is reminiscent of the beginning of the Second Karabakh War.
It is also significant that yesterday Russian Ambassador to Serbia Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko visited Serbian military positions on the borders with Kosovo, which gave rise to numerous speculations and discussions…
However, there is a fundamental difference between the situation in Kosovo and the situation in Karabakh a year ago. And it lies in the fact that while the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was not officially recognized by any state — a member of the international community, including Armenia itself, Kosovo was recognized as a full-fledged independent state by many countries, including not only Albania or Turkey, but also EU countries, the United States and others after a long process.
For this reason, Serbia’s attempt to solve the Kosovo issue through the Karabakh scenario will be perceived as an aggression with all its consequences, including the possibility of a war with Albania and involvement in the conflict of NATO, whose observers are present in its zone.
Serbs are certainly not stupid enough not to understand this, especially in conditions when the Serbian leadership declares Serbia’s aspirations for EU membership. Therefore, it is unlikely that Belgrade will try to eliminate Kosovo as an unrecognized state and regain control over its Albanian-populated areas.
On the other hand, the Serbs could invade the northern part of Kosovo, where the Serbian minority is concentrated, establish military control over it, and declare that they have achieved their goals.
The similarity with the Karabakh scenario, if any, will be that just as Ilham Aliyev announced the resolution of the Karabakh problem despite the fact that part of its internationally recognized territory remains outside Azerbaijan’s control, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic can announce the resolution of the Kosovo problem and the «return of Kosovo» by taking control of only a few of its settlements.
However, the difference will be that if Aliyev announces this after regaining 80% of the occupied territories, in this case the proportions between Serbs and Albanians will be opposite. On the other hand, if Serbia chooses such a scenario, the Kosovo Albanians can use their aggression against their internationally recognized state to officially unite with Albania. And then the Kosovo issue will be closed for the Albanians.
Moreover, as some commentators suggest, this mutual closure of the Kosovo issue in such a way can be covertly coordinated. The consequences of such a scenario for the balance of power in the Balkan region are the subject of a separate discussion.
However, it is obvious that any war, despite its potential appeal to politicians on both sides, carries not only the risk of loss of life but also the risk of getting out of control. This is especially true in the Balkans, where the First World War began a century ago.