The success of the Azerbaijani army on the fronts of the war for the liberation of its territories has caused a large number of its enemies and friends to talk again about the strengthening of Turkey’s position. The Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who recently said that: «After the war in Karabakh, not only the region, but also the world will change. It is already changing. Everyone has seen our strength and we will be considered at a higher level. The role of Azerbaijan in regional issues will be further strengthened. The Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance will be further strengthened, which is vital for both Azerbaijan and Turkey.»
While these prospects inspire fear in some, they bring hope to others. In the post-Soviet space, especially in Russia, the main fear is of Turkey’s consolidation as a powerful regional Muslim and especially Turkic state, while others dream of it as liberation and protection from enemies.
As for those who are afraid, let them enjoy this fear, but as for those who are hopeful, they should consider to what extent their hopes coincide with reality.
Those who have been reading «Voice of Islam» for a long time know that our attitude towards Turkey’s foreign policy has changed — from high hopes for the policy of so-called neo-Ottomanism during the Arab Spring events under Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to disappointment with the abandonment of many positions after his resignation and the formation of a new course, as we have written about many times. Last summer, when the Turkish leadership became more active in the Mediterranean direction, we described the different stages of its foreign policy in the article «Turkey’s New Great Game?
The year 2020 was marked by a series of successes for Turkey, such as the halting of the Assad regime’s offensive in Idlib, a turning point in the war in Libya, and finally, at the end of this year, a change in the balance of power in the South Caucasus at the hands of its ally, which we wrote about two months earlier due to the provocative actions and statements of the Armenian leadership.
Against this backdrop, some fear the rise of so-called Pan-Turkism, especially in the form of the discussed creation of a military alliance between Turkey and Turkic-speaking states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, while others dream of it as liberation and protection from enemies. However, in light of all that has been said above, one important thing should be understood, as many unjustified hopes and subsequent disappointments have arisen due to a lack of understanding.
Despite what some may want to see in Turkey under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan — whether a caliphate or a Turan — it remains first and foremost a nation-state, the Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923 after the collapse of both the Ottoman Caliphate and the Young Turk pan-Turkist projects. Yes, today this country is led by a coalition of two parties, one of which (AKP) is characterized by Ottoman and pan-Islamic sympathies, and the other (MHP) by Turanist sympathies, which is reflected in its foreign policy. However, as experience shows, both can be successfully pursued as long as they do not undermine Turkey’s national principles and contradict its interests.
This means that Turkey cannot (even if it wanted to) solve the problems of other Muslims or Turks for them, and it can only provide effective assistance if they make the necessary efforts to take advantage of it. For example, much has been said about the failure of Turkish policy in Syria after the fall of Aleppo, and there is no point in returning to this topic now. But why was Turkey more effective in Libya? Because the Libyan revolutionaries themselves did what the Syrians failed to do — they created a unified military-political body in the form of the Government of National Accord, which was recognized by the international community as a legitimate authority.
Today, Turkish support is proving effective in the Karabakh war, but why? Because there is an internationally recognized state of Azerbaijan with an economy and an army that has been preparing for a military solution of the problem for all these years, while at the same time working diplomatically to have an alibi for starting the war by exhausting all peaceful means of solving the problem. It is important that Azerbaijan acts strictly in accordance with international law and reclaims the territory recognized as its own. It is important to understand this, because today some hotheads propose to go as far as Yerevan, to restore the power of the Erivan Khanate or to break the Meghri corridor through Armenia, which connects the Azerbaijani mainland with Nakhchivan. However, the leadership of Azerbaijan is trying to avoid military action against Armenia and even speaks of its readiness to grant autonomy to Armenians on its territory in case of a peaceful solution.
Like it or not, this is the way things work. Therefore, if a Turkic military alliance is formed tomorrow, it will not be the result of the New Islamic Army of the Caucasus liberating the Muslim Caucasus, or the Islamic Army of Turkestan liberating Central Asia, but rather because sovereign, internationally recognized states make such a decision themselves, with full rights to do so.
Now let’s see if they are ready. While the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey are obvious, and relations with Uzbekistan are also improving, recent events in Kyrgyzstan show that it is still hostage to pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese forces, and that it is not acceptable for Ankara to have a strong Gulenist presence there. Kazakhstan is increasingly being pulled into China’s orbit, while still looking to Moscow. Turkmenistan, under the rule of its inadequate despots, behaves as if it were a separate planet.
Even with regard to the independent Turkic states, the reality is still far from the fears of some and the dreams of others. Yes, the change in the balance of power in the South Caucasus makes Turkey an important player not only in the region, but also in Central Asia, with whom Beijing and Moscow will have to reckon. However, opposition to the strengthening of its influence will come not only from outside, but also from within the Turkic states. So here, too, there is a huge field of work for years to come.
As for the Muslim and specifically Turkic peoples in Russia, the same applies to them in two ways. While the independent post-Soviet Turkic states have at least nominal sovereignty and in some cases are actually trying to become countries whose interests must be taken into account, the Muslims of the so-called Russian Federation (which in reality has long ceased to be a federation) have completely lost their status during the years of Putin’s rule and are ranked lower than the immigrant diasporas. Turkey cannot change this situation for them, and it is unlikely that it will even try, given its huge front of problems and opponents, from Africa to the South Caucasus.
Therefore, in order for the Muslim peoples of Russia and especially the Turkic peoples to link their prospects with Turkey and to place their hopes on its strengthening, they must regain their own subjectivity. In line with all the above, this would enable Ankara, acting within the framework of international law, to cooperate with them in one way or another instead of shying away from them. This means that in order to achieve joint success, everyone must show determination and work effectively in their own direction, using the resources and opportunities at their disposal. Then it is not excluded that at a certain point they will be able to reinforce each other and produce a synergistic effect.+