Since yesterday, the news of Salah Abdel-Hak’s election to the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood has been discussed in the Russian-speaking segment of social networks (and not only there). However, this news is often presented in a phantasmagoric way, suggesting that the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood living in Saudi Arabia, where it is banned, can mean only one thing — the capture of this movement by the Saudis. So what really happened?
In fact, these rumors reminded me of a Soviet anecdote about not confusing Gogol with Hegel, Hegel with Bebel, Bebel with Babel, and Babel with cable. First, we are talking about Egyptians, not other members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Second, they have not had a single leader since 2021, when their organization split into two factions. Thirdly, the leader of one of the factions was elected at that time, but he died last November, and Salah Abdel-Hak became his successor within that faction. Fourth, the headquarters of this faction is in London, where its new leader resides. He did live in Saudi Arabia and was married to a Saudi woman from a well-known Saudi family, but that was during the Saudi-Muslim Brotherhood romance in the 1980s.
So the split in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood began in the fall of 2021, when its then Supreme Guide, Ibrahim Munir, attempted to gain control of the organization’s General Shura Council by suspending the powers of six of its members. In response, these council members issued a statement rejecting this decision, removing Ibrahim Munir from the position of Supreme Guide, and electing Mahmoud Hussein in his place. In essence, this was largely a conflict between Munir and Hussein, as the latter had already effectively taken control of several directions within the movement, while the former, as the official leader, attempted to regain that control, resulting in the split. The split also took on a territorial aspect, as Hussein and his followers were based in Istanbul, while Munir and his followers were based in London.
Of course, one can speculate about the struggle between English and Turkish interests behind the scenes. However, without denying the possibility of their influence on these processes, it should be noted that there are no fundamental contradictions between Turkey and Britain on foreign policy issues. Therefore, if one of the competing centers were in Paris and the other in Istanbul, it would be an intrigue, but since London and Istanbul (or rather Ankara) present a united front on many international issues, it is unlikely that this is a determining factor.
It is worth noting that Britain has long served as a platform for Islamic opposition movements in many Middle Eastern countries. In this regard, its interests are actually in conflict with those of Saudi Arabia, which became an enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Iraq-Kuwait war, when it allied itself with Saddam Hussein and opposed the Gulf monarchies, which decided to attract Americans to fight against him.
In any case, Ibrahim Munir died last November, and recently his followers elected a new leader in his place, who of course was announced as the new Supreme Guide of the organization. This, of course, was rejected by Hussein’s followers, who did not recognize his authority. It is possible to see the hand of the Saudis, who are interested in the recognition of the Sisi regime by the Egyptian Brotherhood.
However, it is difficult because the current Turkish government is currently reconciling with the Sisi regime and should theoretically be interested in the same, and Istanbul is more vulnerable to its influence than the London center.
Therefore, if a Saudi creature interested in reconciliation with Sisi is elected in London, it would be more logical to support the center in Istanbul, which is under greater Turkish influence. But all these arguments are purely speculative, as we have no reliable information on how the location of the headquarters of competing factions affects their attitude towards Sisi.
And it is not certain that this factor plays a decisive role in these issues, given the Brotherhood’s political experience in exile and its ability to pursue its own policies without bowing to the influence of host countries.
An example of this is the history with the Saudis, when despite good relations with the kingdom’s authorities in the 1980s, they came into conflict with them over the Iraq-Kuwait war.
Therefore, serious analysts tend to explain all these rifts not by the covert games of the intelligence services, with the Brotherhood as their puppet, but by internal crisis phenomena within this movement, which has been experiencing difficult times for a long time.
These difficulties began after the defeat of the Arab Spring, and especially, if we are talking about the Egyptian section of the movement, after the fall of Sisi in 2013.
Against this backdrop, some of its followers and the groups that adhere to them have tended towards more radical methods of struggle, while others, on the contrary, have adopted more reformist positions than the organization’s leadership.
However, one of the inspirers of the «Muslim Brotherhood», Yusuf al-Qaradawi, stated several decades ago that in the new conditions it is more productive for its followers not to strive to act under the auspices of a super-organization, but to disperse into different projects and interact with each other.
Many of them have been doing this for a long time. As for the prospects for change in Egypt, in the foreseeable future they will be determined not so much by the actions of the Egyptian Brotherhood, which can hardly influence much, but by the stability of the Sisi regime and the nature of its policies. Perhaps under the influence of cooperation with certain countries like Turkey.
Nevertheless, we will continue to monitor and inform our readers about what is happening within the oldest political organization in the Islamic world.